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ROAD BLOCK: THE U.S.-MEXICAN
TRUCKING DISPUTE
Andrew G. Edson*

FROM

1. INTRODUCTION

the end of 2007 to March 2009, approved Mexican truckers
under a U.S. Department of Transportation pilot program traveled

across the U.S.-Mexican border ("border") to a destination within
one of the states, unloaded its cargo, and then returned to Mexico.' The
pilot program was the first successful attempt to implement a provision of
the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that permitted Mexican trucks to travel on American roads, set to begin in 2000 but
delayed for seven years.2 Yet, the pilot program lost funding after two
years and Mexican truckers were again subjected to a buffer zone that
only allowed Mexican trucks to drive a few miles onto U.S. soil, unload
3
its cargo, and have the cargo reloaded onto an American truck.
The delay to implement NAFFA provisions for cross-border trucking is
a frequent and ongoing trade dispute between Mexico and the United
States, and it garnered more recent attention when U.S. President Barack
Obama signed into law the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009
(OAA). 4 The bill contained a provision terminating the pilot program
(also called the demonstration project) that allowed a limited number of
Mexican trucks to transport cargoes across the border. 5 Mexico retaliated by slapping tariffs on imported goods from American industries
ranging from strawberries to wine to cell phones. 6 Despite high levels of
trade overall with Mexico, road transport across the border never received full approval from the United States, and the termination of the
7
pilot program is the latest bump in the road.
Neither country has resolved the dispute since the demonstration project lost funding. Obama visited Mexican President Felipe Calderon during the summer of 2009 to promise a resolution over the trucking
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Southern Methodist University.
1. Mexico and the United States: Don't Keep on Trucking, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 2009,
at 4.
2. Id.
3. Richard Simon, Bill Halts Mexico Truck Project, L.A. TimES, Mar. 11, 2009, at 13.
4. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
5. See Omnibus Appropriations Act § 136, Pub. L. No 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, 932 (2009)
(Prohibiting funding for the demonstration project).
6. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
7. Id.
*
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dispute. 8 Calderon requested that the United States restore the ability of
Mexican trucks to cross the border. 9 A year has passed since the United
States ceased the pilot program with virtually no resolution. The action
by Obama and the U.S. Congress unquestionably violates NAFTA provisions, 10 but far greater implications could result in job losses in the
United States and Mexico, as well as growing animosity between two important trading partners." This protectionism mode "could drive the
world into an even worse economic slump than it is already
[experiencing]."'12
11.

BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES-MEXICO
TRUCKING DISPUTE

Prior to NAFTFA, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulated "motor carriers" and did not distinguish between Mexican, Canadian, or United States applications.' 3 In 1980, the passage of the Motor
Carrier Act essentially removed any barrier to transporting goods, thus
paving the way for Mexican and Canadian motor carriers to obtain licenses from the ICC.14 But, two years later the United States issued a
moratorium on granting licenses to Mexican companies, citing safety concerns.' 5 The moratorium signaled an end of the equal treatment given to
U.S. and foreign applicants for motor carrier operating authority.' 6
The moratorium continued through the signing of NAFTA on December 18, 1992.'7 Under Annex I of NAFTA, a Mexican motor carrier had
the ability to obtain operating authority in bordering U.S. states three
years from the date of signing (i.e. December 18, 1995) and to gain operating authority in any of the states after January 1, 2000.18 But on the eve
of its initiation, then U.S. President Clinton delayed the start date, citing
safety reasons again as political pressures from the International Brother8. Nicholas Johnston & Jens E. Gould, Obania Promises Calderon Solution to U.S.Mexico Trucking Spat, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 10, 2009, available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid-aiVLrrhUWbiU.
9. Id.
10. A Small and Dangerous Spat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A30.
11. See id.; see also Chamber Report Links Obama Trade Policies to Loss of U.S. Jobs,
INSIDE US TRADE, 2009 WLNR 18375431, Sept. 18, 2009.
12. A Small and Dangerous Spat, supra note 10.
13. NAFTA Arbitral Panel, Final Report of the Panel in the Matter of Cross-Border
Trucking Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01 9 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http:l/
www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta2o/truckingservices.pdf, [hereinafter Cross-Border
Panel Report].
14. Id.
15. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 752 (2004) (decision reviewing the
background of Mexican motor carriers' entry into the United States. The moratorium was lifted with Canada due to the Brock-Gotlieb Understanding, which continued allowing U.S. carriers to cross into Canada.). See Cross-Border Panel
Report, supra note 13.
16. Cross-Border Panel Report, supra note 13.
17. Id. at 14.
18. Id.
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hood of Teamsters escalated from fears over losing American jobs. 19 The
Teamsters union, whose members included some American motor carriers, argued that Mexican trucks were unsafe, polluted, and their drivers
had insufficient training.2 0
Due to the moratorium, a NAKI'A arbitration panel ruled in 2001 that
the United States was violating NAFTFA provisions governing cross-border trucking and gave Mexico the remedy of imposing retaliatory tariffs. 21 The Panel "unanimously determine[d] that the U.S. blanket refusal
to review and consider for approval any Mexican-owned carrier applications for authority to provide cross-border trucking services was and remains a breach of the U.S. obligations... .of NAFTFA."12 2 Mexico declined
to implement tariffs in hopes that the United States would abide by
NAFrA. 2 3
Former U.S. President Bush attempted to ease border entry for Mexican trucks during his administration, and ultimately was successful in creating a pilot program in 2007 to allow up to one hundred trucking firms
from each country to cross the border. 2 4 Prior to this demonstration program, Mexican trucks were limited to a short distance north of the bor25
der, where their cargo was then transferred to American trucks.
Ricardo Alday, spokesman for the Mexican Embassy in the United
States, stated that during the demonstration program, "26 carriers from
Mexico, with 103 trucks-and 10 from the U.S. [with] 61 trucks crossed the
26
border over 45,000 times without a significant incident."1
Despite the excellent safety record during the pilot program, on March
11, 2009, President Obama signed into law the (JAA, which provided that
"[n]one of the funds appropriated... .may be used. ...to continue a crossborder motor carrier demonstration program to allow Mexican-domiciled
motor carriers to operate beyond. ...the border."12 7 The effect "scrapped"
the pilot program that allowed a small number of Mexican trucks to enter
past the previous twenty-five mile buffer zone where Mexican trucks historically could not pass. 28 This time, Mexico opted on its privilege to respond with tariffs and imposed duties of up to forty-five percent on about
ninety American agricultural and industrial imports. 2 9 For example,
Christmas trees received a twenty percent tariff, fresh grapes received a
19. United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, NAFTA, (Jan. 1998), available at,
http://usmcoc.org/b-naftal2.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
20. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
21. Id.
22. Cross-Border Panel Report, supra note 13, at 81.
23. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
24. Id.
25. See Simon, supra note 3 (T'he actual limitation was twenty miles from the border,
with the exception of Arizona where the limit was seventy-five miles.); see also
Suzanne Gamboa, Congress May End Funding for Pilot Program, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 6, 2009, at 3.
26. Simon, supra note 3.
27. Omnibus Appropriations Act § 136, supra note 5.
28. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
29. Id.
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forty-five percent tariff, and sunglasses received a fifteen percent tariff. 3 0
Bill Adams, U.S. Department of Transportation spokesman, said that
President Obama acknowledged congressional concerns over the pilot
program and was committed to creating a "new trucking project that will
meet the legitimate concerns of Congress and our NAFTA

commitments."13 1

In addition, the Mexican National Chamber of Autotransporte de
Carga, or Canacar, is representing around 4,500 trucking companies in a
suit against the United States for six billion dollars in compensation for
lost business opportunities that were possible if NAFTA provisions were
enforced. 32 Canacarfiled a notice of arbitration on April 2, 2009, pursuant to NAFTA dispute resolution requirements, specifically claiming violations once the U.S. pilot program terminated. 3 3 The United States
indicates that it "intends to defend this claim vigorously."134 Canacar in
its notice explained that the $2.4 billion of tariffs was not an arbitrary
amount, but came from an independent consultant's evaluation of the
damages from delay of the NAFFA provisions. 35
On the one-year anniversary of the pilot program's termination, the
U.S. Congress remains deadlocked on resolving this trade dispute and the
Mexican government said it "has no choice" in continuing its tariffs of

American goods. 36 The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA), a division of the Department of Transportation, commented
that it had not even "floated any proposals with Mexico" for resolution. 37
U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk acknowledged that the United
States has not honored its agreement with Mexico. 38
The result of the termination of the pilot program meant the return of
the twenty-five mile buffer zone, where Mexican goods going north will
"have to be unloaded at the border, reloaded for the short hop across it,
then loaded again onto an American truck."13 9 Mexican authorities claim
this is essentially a "trucking tax," amounting to additional logistical costs
on Mexican trucking businesses. 40 Further, trucks used for the short
drive across the border produce more environmentally damaging emis30. Int'l Trade Admin., Mexico Retaliation: NAFTA Trucking Dispute, available at
http://www.ita.doc.govltdlindustry/otea/301alert/mx-ret.html (last visited on Mar.
30, 2010).
31. Simon, supra note 3.
32. Johnston & Gould, supra note 8.
33. R.G. Edmonson, Canacar Alleges Violation of NAFTA, J. Com. ONLINE, Apr. 14,
2009, http://www.joc.com/node/410742.
34. U.S. Dept. of State, CA NA CAR v. United States, Apr. 2, 2009, available at http:II
www.state.gov/s/l/c29831.htm. No further update was posted as of Mar. 30, 2010.
35. Id. at 17.
36. Jim Landers, Companies Caught in the Middle of U.S.-Mexico Trucking Dispute,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 2010 WLNR 5330852, Mar. 14, 2010.
37. Id.
38. Kirk, Lahood, Locke Meet on Mexico Trucks Dispute, INSIDE US TRADE, 2010
WLNR 5222041, Mar. 12, 2010.
39. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
40. Id.
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sions, so pollution levels at the buffer zone have increased. 4 1'IThis dispute
has touched off diplomatic efforts by both countries to protect the overall

trade status .42
111.

OBJECTIONS TO OPENING THE BORDER

Ever since the pilot program began in 2007, interest groups, led by the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, strongly campaigned against the
program for alleged "safety" reasons . 4 3 In response, Congress piled on
more restrictions before the pilot program could begin .4 4 U.S. companies, perhaps somewhat ironically, showed little interest in participating
in the pilot program - possible reasons included the uncertain future of
the program, the beginning of the current recession, or wariness in trucking through the Mexican interior . 45 The dispute over the program was
much stronger by the transportation organizations on the U.S. side of the

border .4 6

A.

SAFETY CONCERNS

Safety reasons were the cited rationale for terminating the cross-border

trucking program in the Omnibus spending

bill. 4 7

As part of the OAA,

the U.S. Office of Inspector General reviewed the safety inspections during the pilot program. 4 8 The report contained statistics from June 2008 to
June 2009 and found that FMCSA performed more than 220,000 inspections on Mexican trucks. 4 9 In 2008, 21.8% of U.S. trucks removed from
service for safety violations, while Mexican trucks were placed out of service a comparable 21.2% of the time .5 0 Interestingly, 6.9% of U.S. drivers who were inspected violated safety requirements as compared to only

1.2% of Mexican drivers .5 1

Another report to the U.S. Congress by the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) explained that "Mexican trucks are as safe as U.S. trucks
52
and that the [Mexican] drivers are generally safer than U.S. drivers."1
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Mark J. Andrews et al., International TransportationLaw, 42 INT'L LAW. 631, 636
(Summer 2008).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Jose de Cordoba, Mexican Truckers File $6 Billion Claim Against U.S. in NA FTA
Spat, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A4.
48. Joseph W. Come, Follow-Up Audit of Implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement's Cross-Border Trucking Provisions, U.S. DEir. OF TRANS., Aug.
17, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/dot/files/pdfdocs/NAFTAFinalReport.Section..508 - 090209.pdf.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. John Fritteli, NAFIA Implementation: The Future of Commercial Trucking
Across the Mexican Border, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., May 6, 2009, at 9, available
at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL31739-20090506.pdf.
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The supposed safety concern over permitting Mexican drivers and trucks
from crossing the border is considerably weakened when Mexican drivers
and trucks receive better safety reports than U.S. drivers and trucks, and
appears to be merely a "flimsy cover for protectionism."153 Data from
both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the CRS demonstrate
that Mexican trucks and drivers have a better inspection record and fewer
violations than U.S. drivers and trucks.5 4 Further, an American court and
the NAFTA arbitral panel rejected the alleged safety concerns raised by
the Teamsters. 5 5 The panel recognized that safety concerns are a legitimate regulatory objective, but that a blanket moratorium without addressing safety issues was improper. 56 Mexican companies attempted to
disarm safety concerns by investing in new trucks and training drivers to

meet the safety requirements under the demonstration project. 57
B.

Loss

OF AMERICAN JOBS

The driving force behind the opposition to the pilot program and implementation of NAFTFA provisions results instead from fear over outsourcing American jobs to Mexico, as well as the increased competition
that would come from Mexican trucking companies. 5 8 The strongest opposition to the pilot program comes from the U.S. trucking unions, who
claim that U.S. drivers would lose their jobs to lower-paid Mexican drivers. 5 9 These concerns were raised in the debate to initiate the pilot program in 2007, and comments made to FMCSA complained that the
demonstration program "tilt[ed] the competitive advantage to Mexican
carriers and creat~ed] increased competition for smaller carriers in the
U.S.

"60

Further, with lower labor costs and less adherence to trucking regulations, Mexican trucking companies could force small U.S. carriers to
lower costs and further decrease profit margins, which may prevent some
from operating. 6 1 The Owner Operator Independent Drivers Association, critical of the demonstration project and later proponents to end the
project, commented that Mexican carriers had the advantage of arriving
into the United States with fuel tanks filled to capacity, thus avoiding the
federal and state fuel taxes. 62 This would create an uneven economic
competitive environment where U.S. drivers would face higher fees and
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

A Small and Dangerous Spat, supra note 10.
Id.
Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
Cross-Border Panel Report, supra note 13, at 83.
Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
John Gallagher, Racing for NA FTA Freight, TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar. 12, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4567604.
Gamboa, supra note 25.
Demonstration Project on NAFTA Trucking Provisions, 72 Fed. Reg. 46263, 46285
(Aug. 17, 2007).
Id.
Id.
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would lose out on bids.63
But, the FMCSA responded that the demonstration would not have a
"significant adverse impact on U.S. motor carriers or drivers."16 4 Mexican
carriers under the project did not have authority to handle domestic
freight jobs within the United States but only those across the border, so

the fears of U.S. carriers were unfounded. 65 This illustrates that the mo-

tive for opposing implementation of the pertinent NAFTFA trucking pro66
visions is trade protectionism.
Instead of job losses in either the United States or Mexico, NAFI'A has
benefited both countries in creating jobs and increasing the number of
goods purchased and sold according to the United States Trade Representative.6 7 Between 1993 and 2007, trade between the countries tripled
to $930 billion, U.S. employment rose twenty-four percent, and workers
in Mexico received higher wages than previously paid. 68 Of course, the
trade was accomplished with transportation means other than trucking
services, but the statistics above help demonstrate that concerns over U.S.
jobs due are largely unfounded.
IV.

CURRENT EFFECTS ON THE UNITED STATES
AND MEXICO

The United States and Mexico have a lot at stake in the trucking dispute, considering the $350 billion of commerce between two countries
every year. 69 Besides the annual commerce, the tariffs imposed by Mexico on about ninety American imports are hurting states that produce
such goods. 70 The tariff penalties were "carefully chosen to avoid pushing up prices of staples in Mexico while hitting goods that are important
exports for a range of American states."17' But more dangerous effects
are apparent from this trade spat.
In the United States, these tariffs could result in job losses, export
losses, and extra transportation fees. 72 A report by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce states that the termination of the demonstration project will
lead to a decline in exports of $2.6 billion and could lead to a loss of
25,600 jobs. 7 3 Noneconomic effects include loss of confidence that the
United States will honor its trade agreements during difficult economic
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
A Small and Dangerous Spat, supra note 10.
NAFTA-Myth v. Facts, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Mar.
2008, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/
asset-upload-file7l_14540.pdf.
Id.
Id.
Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
Id.
Chamber Report, supra note It.
Id.
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times.74

Moreover, cities along the U.S.-Mexican border, such as Laredo,

Texas, with about $110 billion in two-way freight crossing over its bridges
yearly, will likely lose the benefit of the trucking program . 7 5 White
House spokesman Robert Gibbs acknowledged the harm when he said
that the United States is not interested in creating barriers to valuable
trading partnerships during a recession .7 6
In Mexico, the economy is already suffering from the recession in the
United States.7 7 Mexico's export factories have lost over 65,000 jobs

from October 2008 to March

2009.78

This is due to the decline in exports

generally; automobile exports fell fifty percent in the beginning of 2009.79
The U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics reported that U.S.-Mexico

surface trade fell 17.1 % in July of 2009 compared to July

2008.80

The

value of imports carried by truck was 13.7% lower in July 2009 than July
2008, while the value of exports carried by truck was 14.7% lower. 8 1
President Calderon of Mexico confirmed these statistics when he told
President Obama that "the dispute has hurt trade, raised consumer costs

and reduced job creation."8112

The economic effects of the trucking dispute between the United States

and Mexico has united regional leaders in finding a solution. 83

U.S. gov-

ernors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas along with Mexican governors of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon,
Sonora and Tamaulipas issued a joint statement at the Border Governors
Conference in Monterrey, Mexico that called for a resolution of the
trucking dispute. 8 4 The Governors acknowledged that border security
concerns exist, but believe that both governments can honor
"[NAFTFA's]. ...regulations to allow U.S. and Mexican trucks to safety
[sic.] operate across our international border between our countries."18 5
Yet no signal of how the U.S. administration plans on resolving the dispute has appeared, providing little solace to agricultural producers, such
as California grape growers, hit hard by the tariffs implemented by Mexico. 8 6 U.S. Agricultural Secretary Tom Vilsack stated that the resolution
to the trucking dispute was taking too long and that he would act sooner
74. A Small and Dangerous Spat, supra note 10.
75. Dudley Althaus & Steward Powell, The Americas' Billions at Stake in Trade Dispute, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 17, 2009, at Al.
76. Id.
77. Marc Lacey & Ginger Thompson, Obama's Next Foreign Crisis Could be Next
Door, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at Al.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. July 2009 Surface Trade with Canada and Mexico, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http:l
/www.bts.gov/press-releases/2009/bts046_09/pdf/btsO46O09.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Johnson & Gould, supra note 8.
83. Governors Call for Mexican Truck Fix, Vilsack Criticizes Slow Pace, INSIDE US
TRADE, 2009 WL 17853664, Sept. 11, 2009.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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if it were within his authority. 8 7
The U.S. grape market is illustrative of the harmful effects the trucking
dispute has upon the economy. 88 Grapes face the highest tariff rate,
forty-five percent. The tariff has "effectively closed" the $58 million industry, harming the 58,000 people employed in the grape industry. 89 The
tariffs provided incentive for over 150 manufacturers, retailers, and agricultural producers to form a coalition called the "Alliance to Keep U.S.
Jobs." 90 Pressure to resolve the trucking dispute has come from private
industries, government leaders, elected officials, yet no resolution has resulted since President Obama promised action to President Calderon.
V.

NAFTFA AT THE CROSSROADS

President Obama's administration has a large checklist currently, and
resolving the trucking dispute may sit lower on the list as compared to
healthcare or fighting the Taliban. 9 ' But, the United States can "walk
and chew gum at the same time.. .[it] can move forward with other priorities, but there's no reason to put trade on the back burner."192 President
Obama should encourage Congress either to revive the demonstration
project or to start a new pilot program. 9 3 One solution is to insert funding for the project into another bill. 94 There is a lot at stake-fulfilling
NAFI'A requirements and reassuring U.S. trading partners that it will
honor its trade agreements during difficult economic times. 9 5 Between
the United States and Mexico alone, lack of resolution on this dispute
could threaten more than $350 billion of commerce annually. 96 Approximately two-thirds of that commerce is transported across the border
roadways. 97
Mexico has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, and despite the
termination of the demonstration project that permitted a few Mexican
truckers onto American roadways, Mexico still permits U.S. truckers to
cross its borders as a sign of good will. 98 The demonstration project
showed the benefits of open cross-border trade, such as one participating
carrier shaving off $600,000 of fuel costs and trip time.9 9 The demonstration project had initial positive results about implementing a broader
87. Id.
88. Peter Cohn, Firms Form Alliance to Urge Resolution of Trucking Dispute, NATIONAL JOURNAL, JUL 24, 2009, available at http://www.keepusjobs.org/Congress
Daily% 2OJuly% 2024.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Chamber Report, supra note 11.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Gamboa, supra note 25.
95. Id.
96. A Smnall and Dangerous Spat, supra note 10.
97. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
98. Mexico Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan, Congress Doesn't Respect NAFTA, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at 15.
99. Id.
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trucking policy as envisioned by NAFTA between the United States and
Mexico. Yet protectionism won out when the Congressional spending bill
eliminated funding for the program.' 0 0
The failure of a resolution over the trucking dispute may extend beyond the two trading partners to other countries. Brazil is threatening to
join Mexico's retaliation measures for United States' failure to honor
trade agreements regarding cotton.' 0 ' Brazil may place tariffs of up to
one hundred percent on U.S. exports of health care products, which could
amount to $591 million in retaliatory relief. 10 2 The trucking dispute concerns more than authorizing a few trucking companies to cross the border; resolving the dispute is a signal that U.S. trade agreements are
honored and important. Further, it signals the continuing viability of
NAFTA.

100. Don't Keep on Trucking, supra note 1.
101. Landers, supra note 36.
102. Id.
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